UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 03 MDL 1570 (RCC) ECF Case	
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This document relates to:

Federal Insurance Co. v. al Qaida 03 CV 06978 (RCC)

PLAINTIFFS' MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AS TO THE SAUDI COMMITTEE FOR RELIEF AND CHARITY WORK ABROAD

1. In the wake of the September 11th Attack, international investigations into al Qaida's financial infrastructure revealed that numerous purported charities, operating under the control of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, had long served as al Qaida's principal sources of financial and logistical support.

2. In this regard, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) found that there was "a likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaida."

3. The 9/11 Commission's Staff expanded on that finding in a subsequent Monograph on al Qaida's financing, explaining that "al Qaida was funded to the tune of approximately \$30 million per year, by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors, primarily in the Gulf region."

4. The 9/11 Commission Staff Monograph further states that "the intelligence community identified (Saudi Arabia) as the primary source of money for al Qaida both before

and after the September 11th attacks. Fund-raisers and facilitators throughout Saudi Arabia and the Gulf raised money for al Qaida from witting and unwitting donors and diverted funds from Islamic charities and mosques."

5. On June 2, 2004, nearly three years after the September 11th Attack, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia finally bowed to intense international pressure and announced that it would be dissolving all of its international charities, and folding their operations into a new government agency, to be called the Saudi Committee for Relief and Charity Work Abroad.

6. The Saudi Committee for Relief and Charity Work Abroad is an agency, instrumentality and/or organ of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

7. Since June 2, 2004, the operations of several of al Qaida's prominent charity fronts have been folded into the Saudi Committee for Relief and Charity Work Abroad, including the operations of al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, Waqf Foundation, The Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya, and the Saudi High Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter the "predecessor charities").

8. The Saudi Committee for Relief and Charity Work Abroad has acquired the assets and obligations of the predecessor charities, and is continuing the operations of those predecessor charities, using the same facilities and personnel throughout the World.

9. As successor in interest to the assets, liabilities and operations of al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, Waqf Foundation, the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya and Saudi High Commission for Bosnia and

Herzegovina, the Saudi Committee for Relief and Charity Work Abroad is legally responsible for the tortious conduct and debts of those predecessor charities.

Respectfully submitted,

COZEN O'CONNOR

By: /s/ STEPHEN A. COZEN (SC 1625) ELLIOTT R. FELDMAN (EF 8111) SEAN P. CARTER (SC 0636) 1900 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 215-665-2000

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

03 MDL 1570 (RCC) ECF Case

This document relates to:

Federal Insurance Co. v. al Qaida 03 CV 06978 (RCC)

THE FEDERAL INSURANCE PLAINTIFFS' MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING ADDING CERTAIN DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(e) AND 15(d) AND PARAGRAPH 12 OF CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER #2

1. As identified in the *Federal* plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, defendant "al

Haramain a/k/a al Haramain Foundation" refers to and includes the al Haramain Foundation of

Saudi Arabia, as well as any and all subsidiary or branch offices thereof, including without

limitation, all of the following, each of whom has been and is identified as a defendant herein:

- a. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Saudi Arabia)
- b. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Afghanistan)
- c. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Albania)
- d. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Bangladesh)
- e. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
- f. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Ethiopia)
- g. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Indonesia)
- h. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Kenya)
- i. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Netherlands)
- j. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Pakistan)

- k. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Somalia)
- 1. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Tanzania)
- m. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (United States)

2. As identified in the *Federal* plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, defendants "Muslim World League" and "Muslim World League Offices" refer to and include the Muslim World League of Saudi Arabia, as well as any subsidiary or branch offices thereof, including without limitation, all of the following, each of whom has been and is identified as a defendant herein:

- a. Muslim World League (Buenos Aires, Argentina)
- b. Muslim World League (Preston, Australia)
- c. Muslim World League (Vienna, Austria)
- d. Muslim World League (Dhaka, Bangladesh)
- e. Muslim World League (Bujumbura, Burundi)
- f. Muslim World League (Etobicoke, Canada)
- g. Muslim World League (Moroni, Comores)
- h. Muslim World League (Brazzaville, Congo)
- i. Muslim World League (Kobenhaven, Denmark)
- j. Muslim World League (Mantes la Joile, France)
- k. Muslim World League (Libreville, Gabon)
- 1. Muslim World League (Jakarta, Indonesia)
- m. Muslim World League (Rome, Italy)
- n. Muslim World League (Amman, Jordan)
- o. Muslim World League (Nairobi, Kenya)
- p. Muslim World League (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)

q.	Muslim World League (Nouakchott, Mauritania)
r.	Muslim World League (Mauritius, Mauritius)
S.	Muslim World League (Maputo, Mozambique)
t.	Muslim World League (Wuse Abuja, Nigeria)
u.	Muslim World League (Islamabad, Pakistan)
V.	Muslim World League (Makati City, Philippines)
W.	Muslim World League (Male, Republic of Maldives)
X.	Muslim World League (Moscow, Russia)
y.	Muslim World League (Makkah, Saudi Arabia)
Z.	Muslim World League (Dakar, Senegal)
aa.	Muslim World League (Djibouti, Somalia)
bb.	Muslim World League (Gauteng, South Africa)
cc.	Muslim World League (Khartoum, Sudan)
dd.	Muslim World League (Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania)
ee.	Muslim World League (Bangkok, Thailand)
ff.	Muslim World League (Lome, Togo)
gg.	Muslim World League (Port of Spain, Trinidad)
hh.	Muslim World League (London, U.K.)
ii.	Muslim World League (Kampala, Uganda)
jj.	Muslim World League (New York, U.S.A.)
kk.	Muslim World League (Falls Church, U.S.A.)

"World Assembly of Muslim Youth" refers to and includes World Assembly of Muslim Youth of Saudi Arabia, as well as any and all subsidiary or branch offices thereof, including without limitation, all of the following, each of whom has been and is identified as a defendant herein:

As identified in the Federal plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, defendant

3.

- a. World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)
- b. World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)
- c. World Assembly of Muslim Youth (London, United Kingdom)
- d. World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Falls Church, Virginia)

4. As identified in the *Federal* plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, defendant "International Islamic Relief Organization" refers to and includes International Islamic Relief Organization of Saudi Arabia, as well as any and all subsidiary or branch offices thereof, including without limitation, all of the following, each of whom has been and is identified as a defendant herein:

- a. International Islamic Relief Organization (Saudi Arabia)
- b. International Islamic Relief Organization branch offices in Africa, Asia, Europe, Canada, the United States of America, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

5. As identified in the *Federal* plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, defendant "Taibah International Aide Association" refers to and includes The Taibah International Aide Association of the United States, and The Taibah International Aide Association of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6. As identified in the *Federal* plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, defendant "Benevolence International Foundation" refers to and includes Benevolence International Foundation of Saudi Arabia, as well as any and all subsidiary or branch offices thereof, including without limitation, all of the following, each of whom has been and is identified as a defendant herein:

- a. Benevolence International Foundation (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
- b. Benevolence International Foundation (Canada)

- c. Benevolence International Foundation (Saudi Arabia)
- d. Benevolence International Foundation (United States)

7. Additional defendant Saudi Commission for Relief and Charity Abroad is an agency, instrumentality and/or organ of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the successor in interest to numerous Saudi charities dissolved due to their extensive involvement in sponsoring al Qaida, including, without limitation, al Haramain Foundation, Waqf Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, Saudi Joint Relief Committee and Saudi High Commission.

Dated: September 10, 2004

Respectfully submitted,

COZEN O'CONNOR

By:_____/s/

STEPHEN A. COZEN, ESQUIRE ELLIOTT R. FELDMAN, ESQUIRE SEAN P. CARTER, ESQUIRE MARK T. MULLEN, ESQUIRE LISA C. HAAS, ESQUIRE J. SCOTT TARBUTTON, ESQUIRE 1900 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: (215) 665-2000 Fax: (215) 665-2013

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

PHILA1\2130787\1 117430.000

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001	03 MDL 1570 (RCC) ECF Case
	RICO STATEMENT applicable to the Muslim World League Group, as that term is herein defined

This document relates to:

Federal Insurance Co. v. al Qaida 03 CV 06978 (RCC)

RICO STATEMENT APPLICABLE TO MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE GROUP

Based on information currently available, plaintiffs submit this RICO statement pursuant to the Case Management Order dated June 15, 2004 for defendants:

- Muslim World League
- Muslim World League New York
- International Islamic Relief Organization.
- Rabita Trust
- Wa-el Hamza Julaidan

(These defendants are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Muslim World League Group"). Given the vastly complicated nature of the conspiracy and other wrongdoing that led to the events of September 11, 2001, much information is presently unavailable to plaintiffs, absent discovery. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this RICO statement as information is learned and verified and after discovery is obtained.

- 1. The unlawful conduct is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and/or (d).
- 2. The names of the defendants to whom this RICO statement pertains are the Muslim World League and the Muslim World League New York (the "MWL"), the International Islamic Relief Organization ("IIRO"), the Rabita Trust (the "Rabita Trust"), and Wa'el Hamza Julaidan ("Julaidan"). The alleged misconduct and basis for liability is set forth in Exhibit "A".

- 3. Not applicable. All known wrongdoers are named as defendants in this action. Given the vastly complicated nature of the conspiracy and other wrongdoing that led to the events of September 11, 2001, however, much information is unavailable to plaintiffs, and the identities of other wrongdoers may be revealed through discovery. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this RICO statement as information is learned and verified and after discovery is obtained.
- 4. The name of each victim and the manner in which each was injured is indicated on the chart attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
 - NY CLS Penal § 105.15; conspiracy to commit murder NY CLS Penal § 125.25(xi) NY CLS Penal § 105.15; conspiracy to commit arson NY CLS Penal § 150.15 Travel Act 18 U.S.C. § 1952 illegal transactions in monetary 18 U.S.C. § 1956 instruments money laundering 18 U.S.C. § 1957 defrauding the US Government 18 U.S.C. § 371 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), (2) filing false or materially false tax returns engaging in a corrupt endeavor to impede 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and impair the due administration of the internal revenue laws
- 5. (a) list of predicate acts and specific statutes violated:

(b) dates of, the participants in, and a description of the facts surrounding the predicate acts

DATES	PARTICIPANTS	FACTS
mid-1990s to 9/11/2001	The Muslim World League Group	Throughout this period, the Muslim World League Group conspired to support terrorism and to obfuscate the roles of the various participants and conspirators in Radical Muslim Terrorism, which conspiracy culminated in the Attack.
late 1990s to 9/11/2001	The Muslim World League Group	The Muslim World League Group undertook the above-named actions as part of a conspiracy to commit murder and arson, in that it knew that the Enterprise in which it was participating, Radical Muslim Terrorism, planned to and would commit an act of deadly aggression against the United States in the near future, using the resources and support supplied by the Muslim World League Group
mid-1990s to 9/11/2001	The Muslim World League Group	The Muslim World League Group agreed to form and associate itself with the Enterprise and agreed to commit more than two predicate acts, <i>i.e.</i> , multiple acts of murder and arson, in furtherance of a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with the Enterprise.

- (c) not applicable
- (d) No.
- (e) No.
- (f) The predicate acts form a pattern of racketeering in that they are continuous, and are a part of the Enterprise's regular way of doing business. Other of the defendants consistently, evenly constantly, laundered money, filed false tax returns, and otherwise impeded and impaired the administration of the tax laws as part of their scheme to conduit money to terrorists, and yet obfuscate their support of Radical Muslim Terrorism.

- (g) The predicate acts relate to each other (horizontal relatedness) as part of a common plan because each act of money laundering and tax evasion allowed certain of the defendants to surreptiously provide funds to terrorist organizations, including al Qaida, which conspiracy culminated in the Attack.
- 6.
- (a) The enterprise (the "Enterprise" or "Radical Muslim Terrorism") is comprised of the defendants named in the First Amended Complaint, and is a collection of persons, organizations, businesses, and nations associated in fact.
- (b) The Enterprise has its origins in the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, when Osama Bin Ladin ("Bin Ladin") formed an organization called "The Foundation" or "al Qaida." Al Qaida was intended to serve as a foundation upon which to build a global Islamic army. The structure of the Enterprise is an association in fact with common and complex goals that consist of far more than the mere desire to perpetrate the acts of racketeering outlined herein. Rather, the Enterprise utilizes acts of racketeering to further its overall common purposes of: (i) spreading a particularly virulent brand of radical, conservative Islam; (ii) eliminating Western influences in Islamic countries, including Western influences that are perceived to keep in power repressive Arab regimes that are not true to Islam; and (iii) punishing Israel, and the United States for its perceived support of Israel. Radical Muslim Terrorism does not feature a centralized hierarchy, because the lack of a centralized hierarchy is essential to the Enterprise's clandestine nature and its success. Thus, although al Qaida had its own membership roster and a structure of "committees" to guide and oversee such functions as training terrorists, proposing targets, financing operations, and issuing edicts, the committees were not a hierarchical chain of command but were instead a means for coordinating functions and providing material support to operations. The Muslim World League Group fits neatly into this framework by raising funds for and providing funding to and otherwise providing material support for the members of the Enterprise who engaged in the Attack.
- (c) no.
- (d) The Muslim World League Group is associated with the Enterprise.
- (e) Each member of the Muslim World League Group is a member of the Enterprise, and is separate and distinct from the Enterprise.
- (f) The Muslim World League Group intended to further the Attack and adopted the goal of furthering and/or facilitating that criminal endeavor, which criminal activity culminated in the Attack.

- 7. The pattern of racketeering activity conducted by the Muslim World League Group is separate from the existence of Radical Muslim Terrorism, but was a necessary component to the Attack.
- 8. The Enterprise conducts terrorism all over the world; the racketeering activity conducted by the Muslim World League Group funds that activity, which activity culminated in the Attack. The usual and daily activities of the Enterprise includes recruitment, indoctrination, and the provisioning and operation of training camps, all of which activities are funded by the racketeering activities described herein.
- 9. The Enterprise benefits by spreading its ideology, by suppressing other forms of Islam, and through the gratification of destroying its perceived enemies.
- 10. The Enterprise, and the racketeering activities conducted by the Muslim World League Group, relies heavily on the American interstate system of commerce for banking, supplies, communications, and virtually all its essential commercial functions, and in that manner affects interstate commerce. Additionally, the Attack itself affected commerce. <u>See Rasul v. Bush</u>, 124 S. Ct. 2686, No. 03-334, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4760, * 8 (stating that the Attack "severely damaged the U.S. economy").
- 11. Not applicable.
- 12. Not applicable.
- 13. Radical Muslim Terrorism "employs" certain individuals, only a few of whose identities are known, including defendant Osama bin Ladin.
- 14. The history of the conspiracy behind Radical Muslim Terrorism could, and has, filled many books, but for purposes of the present RICO Statement, the following is offered. After being turned out of the Sudan in May 1996, al Qaida established itself in Afghanistan, and relied on well-placed financial facilitators, including the Muslim World League Group, and laundered funds from Islamic so-called charities, including charities like the MWL, the MWLNY, the IIRO, and corporations. The financial facilitators also raised money from witting and unwitting donors. They also relied heavily on certain imams at mosques who were willing to divert the *zakat*, the mandatory charitable contributions required of all Muslims. Al Qaida also collected money from employees of corrupted charities.

The funds thus raised were used to, among other things, operate terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, where some recruits were trained in conventional warfare but where the best and most zealous recruits received terrorist training. The curriculum in the camps placed with great emphasis on ideological and religious indoctrination. All trainees and other personnel were encouraged to think creatively about ways to commit mass murder.

The camps were able to operate only because of the worldwide network of recruiters, travel facilitators, and document forgers who vetted recruits and helped them get in and out of Afghanistan. From the ranks of these recruits the nineteen perpetrators of the Attack were selected. None of this would have been possible without the funds supplied

by participants and conspirators like the Muslim World League Group. Indeed, the Enterprise would not have been successful without the enthusiastic participation of all of the conspirators, including the Muslim World League Group. In order to identify nineteen individuals willing, able and competent to carry out the Attack, al Qaida needed to select from a vast pool of recruits and trainees, which pool would not have been available to it without the assistance provided by the Muslim World League Group. The Muslim World League Group, with knowledge and intent, agreed to the overall objectives of the conspiracy, and agreed to commit at least two predicate acts and all agreed to participate in the conspiracy, either expressly or impliedly. The Muslim World League Group also, with knowledge and intent, agreed to and did aid and abet all of the above illegal activities, RICO predicate acts, and RICO violations.

- 15. As the subrogees of both individual and property claimants, plaintiffs have been harmed in their business and property through the claims that they have paid out or for which they have reserved.
- 16. Plaintiffs' damages -- injuries, the loss of life and property damage that resulted from defendants' actions -- are direct in that they are not derivative of damage to a third party. Rather the plaintiffs' insureds' assignees were the "reasonably foreseeable victims of a RICO violation" and the "intended victims of the racketeering enterprise," *i.e.*, terrorism, the culmination of which was the Attack.
- 17. Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the damages suffered by each plaintiff, as set forth in Exhibit "B".

VI	Torture Victim Protection Act,
	28 U.S.C. § 1350
VIII	RICO,
	18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 1962(d)
Х	Anti-Terrorism Act,
	18 U.S.C. § 2333

19. pendent state claims:

Ι	Trespass
Π	Wrongful Death
III	Survival
IV	Assault & Battery
V	Intentional and Negligent
	Infliction of Emotional Distress
VII	Conspiracy
IX	Aiding and Abetting
XI	Negligence
XII	Punitive Damages

20. not applicable

EXHIBIT "A"

RICO STATEMENT

QUESTION # 2

DEFENDANT	MISCONDUCT	BASIS OF LIABILITY
The MWL & the MWLNY	The MWL is among the world's largest Islamic charitable organizations, with offices in more than thirty countries. The MWL serves as an umbrella organization for a number of other Islamic charities, commonly referred to as bodies or members of the League, including the IIRO, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth ("WAMY"), al Haramain & al Aqsa Mosque Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation ("BIF") and the Rabita Trust. The MWL has long operated as a fully integrated component of al Qaida's financial and logistical infrastructure, and provided material support and resources to al Qaida and affiliated FTOs. The MWLNY is the New York office of the MWL. The MWL has provided substantial material support and resources to al Qaida through its subsidiary bodies, including the IIRO, WAMY, the Rabita Trust, and BIF.	1962(c) 1962(d)
IIRO	The IIRO is a subsidiary body of the MWL, with offices throughout the globe. According to MWL officials, the MWL provides "humanitarian assistance" through the arms of the IIRO. In reality, the IIRO is one of the charities operating within al Qaida's support infrastructure, and the IIRO has long operated as a fully integrated component of al Qaida's logistical and financial support infrastructure, and provided material support and resources to al Qaida and affiliated FTOs. According to the recently declassified 1996 CIA report regarding the involvement of Islamic charities in the sponsorship of terrorism, the IIRO funded six al Qaida training camps in	1962(c) 1962(d)

	Afghanistan, including camps from which al Qaida planned, approved and coordinated the Attack, and at which some or all of the September 11 hijackers received indoctrination and training. Moreover, forty to fifty percent of the IIRO's charitable funds were used to finance terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Kashmir.	
Rabita Trust	The Rabita Trust is a subsidiary body of the MWL, with headquarters in Lahore, Pakistan and offices throughout the world. Rabita was designated by President Bush as an organization that provided logistical and financial support to al Qaida. Rabita Trust was led by defendant Julaidan, a founder of al Qaida. Rabita Trust has, for a period of many years and in diverse regions throughout the world, provided critical financial and logistical support to al Qaida in relation to that terrorist organization's global jihad, knowing that such support would result in an attack like the one that occurred on September 11, 2001.	1962(c) 1962(d)
Julaidan	Julaidan, a Saudi citizen, is an associate of Osama bin Laden, having fought with him in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and is a founding member of al Qaida. In February 2000, Julaidan was appointed to the Board of Trustees of the Rabita Trust and served as its director general. On September 6, 2002, the United States Department of Treasury designated Julaidan a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to Executive Order 13224. In his capacity as an associate of bin Laden, a founder of al Qaida, and the director general of Rabita Trust, Julaidan was a full participant and conspirator in the events leading up to the Attack.	1962(c) 1962(d)

EXHIBIT "B"

Federal Insurance Company, et al. v. al Qaida et al., 03cv6978 Plaintiffs Paid to Date ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY \$12,945,647.78 AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE CORPORATION \$2,590,862.56 AMERICAN EMPLOYERS' INSURANCE COMPANY \$325,421.23 AMERICAN GUARANTEE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY \$44,407,749.17 \$2,365,183.61 AMERICAN ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY AMLIN UNDERWRITING, LTD. \$66,991,142.12 ASSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA \$2,417,600.19 BOSTON OLD COLONY INSURANCE COMPANY \$5,100.00 CHUBB CUSTOM INSURANCE COMPANY \$612,585.00 CHUBB INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY \$3,771,622.01 CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA \$44,547,557.24 CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY \$410,681.69 CNA CASUALTY OF CALIFORNIA \$25,771.00 COLONIAL AMERICAN CASUALTY AND SURETY INS. COMPANY \$21,400.00 \$141,343.00 COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEWARK, NJ CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY \$542,627.00 CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY \$39,073.00 CRUM & FORSTER INDEMNITY COMPANY \$44,300.08 FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY \$1,310,819,537.70 FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK \$79,856.00 FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND \$7,636,903.02 GLENS FALLS INSURANCE COMPANY \$36,239.00 GREAT LAKES REINSURANCE U.K. PLC \$57,682,223.62 GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY \$598,520,989.15 HISCOX DEDICATED CORPORATE MEMBER, LTD. \$228,774,228.62 HOMELAND INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK \$210,670.75 MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY \$448,063.19 NATIONAL BEN FRANKLIN INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS \$6,442.00 NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY \$3,405,966.77 \$1,288,908.39 NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK ONE BEACON AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY \$85,101.50 ONE BEACON INSURANCE COMPANY \$185,924,621.93 PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY \$20,917,471.59 SENECA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. \$4,039,407.18 STEADFAST INSURANCE COMPANY \$392,783.63 THE CAMDEN FIRE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION \$76,620.00 THE PRINCETON EXCESS & SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY \$3,796,292.50 UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY \$75,434,277.11 VALIANT INSURANCE COMPANY \$3,500.00 VIGILANT INSURANCE COMPANY \$41,781,107.08 ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY \$783,686,766.26

RICO STATEMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001	03 MDL 1570 (RCC) ECF Case
	RICO STATEMENT applicable to WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH

This document relates to:

Federal Insurance Co. v. al Qaida 03 CV 06978 (RCC)

RICO STATEMENT APPLICABLE TO WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH

Based on information currently available, and pursuant to the Case Management Order dated June 15, 2004, plaintiffs submit this RICO statement for defendant World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).

Given the vastly complicated nature of the conspiracy and other wrongdoing that led to the events of September 11, 2001, much information is presently unavailable to plaintiffs, absent discovery. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this RICO statement as information is learned and verified and after discovery is obtained.

- 1. The unlawful conduct is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (c) and/or (d).
- 2. The names of the defendant to whom this RICO statement pertains is WAMY. The alleged misconduct and basis for liability is set forth in Exhibit "A".
- 3. Not applicable. All known wrongdoers are named as defendants in this action. Given the vastly complicated nature of the conspiracy and other wrongdoing that led to the events of September 11, 2001, however, much information is unavailable to plaintiffs, and the identities of other wrongdoers may be revealed through discovery. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this RICO statement as information is learned and verified and after discovery is obtained.
- 4. The name of each victim and the manner in which each was injured is indicated on the chart attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
- 5. (a) list of predicate acts and specific statutes violated:

conspiracy to commit murder	NY CLS Penal § 105.15; NY CLS Penal § 125.25(xi)
conspiracy to commit arson	NY CLS Penal § 105.15; NY CLS Penal § 150.15
fraud with identification documents	18 U.S.C. § 1028
Travel Act	18 U.S.C. § 1952
illegal transactions in monetary instruments	18 U.S.C. § 1956
money laundering	18 U.S.C. § 1957
financial institutions fraud	18 U.S.C. § 1344
mail fraud	18 U.S.C. § 1341
wire fraud	18 U.S.C. § 1343
Filing false or materially false tax returns	26 U.S.C. § 7206(1),(2)
Engaging in a corrupt endeavor to impede and impair the due administration of the internal revenue laws	26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)
Providing material support of Terrorism	18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(g)(5)(B) 18 U.S.C. § 2339A 18 U.S.C. § 2339B 18 U.S.C. § 2339C
Anti-Terrorism Act	18 U.S.C. § 2332b

(b) dates of, the participants in, and a description of the facts surrounding the predicate acts

DATES	PARTICIPANTS	FACTS
late 1980s to the present	WAMY	Participant conspired to support terrorism and to obfuscate the roles of the various participants and conspirators in the al Qaida movement, which conspiracy culminated in the Attack.
late 1980s to the present	WAMY	Participant undertook the above-named actions as part of a conspiracy to commit murder and arson, in that it knew that the

		Enterprise in which it was participating, the al Qaida movement, planned to and would commit acts of deadly aggression against the United States in the near future, using the resources and support it supplied.
late 1980s to the present	WAMY	Participant agreed to form and associate itself with the Enterprise and agreed to commit more than two predicate acts, <i>i.e.</i> , multiple acts of money laundering, murder and arson, in furtherance of a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with the Enterprise.

- (c) not applicable
- (d) No.
- (e) No.
- (f) The predicate acts form a pattern of racketeering in that they are continuous, and are a part of the Enterprise's regular way of doing business. Other of the defendants consistently, evenly constantly, laundered money, filed false tax returns, and otherwise impeded and impaired the administration of the tax laws as part of their scheme to conduit money to terrorists, and obfuscate their support of the al Qaida movement.
- (g) The predicate acts relate to each other (horizontal relatedness) as part of a common plan because each act of money laundering, technical support and tax evasion allowed certain of the defendants to surreptitiously provide funds to terrorist organizations, including al Qaida, which conspiracy culminated in the Attack.
- (a) The enterprise (the "Enterprise" or "the al Qaida movement") is comprised of the defendants named in the First Amended Complaint, and is a collection of persons, organizations, businesses, and nations associated in fact.
- (b) The Enterprise has its origins in the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, when Osama Bin Laden ("Bin Laden") formed an organization called "The Foundation" or "al Qaida." Al Qaida was intended to serve as a foundation upon which to build a global Islamic army. The structure of the Enterprise is an association in fact with common and complex goals that consist of far more than the mere desire to perpetrate the acts of racketeering outlined herein. Rather, the Enterprise utilizes acts of racketeering to further its overall common purposes of: (i) spreading a particularly virulent brand of radical, conservative Islam; (ii) eliminating Western influences in Islamic countries; and (iii) punishing Israel, and the United States for its perceived support of Israel. The al Qaida movement does not feature a centralized hierarchy, because the lack of a centralized hierarchy is essential to the Enterprise's clandestine nature and its success. Thus, although al Qaida had its own membership

roster and a structure of "committees" to guide and oversee such functions as training terrorists, proposing targets, financing operations, and issuing edicts, the committees were not a hierarchical chain of command but were instead a means for coordinating functions and providing material support to operations. WAMY fits neatly into this framework by raising and providing funds for, and otherwise providing material support for the al Qaida movement.

- (c) No.
- (d) WAMY is associated with the Enterprise.
- (e) WAMY is a member of the Enterprise, and is separate and distinct from the Enterprise.
- (f) WAMY intended to further the Attack and adopted the goal of furthering and/or facilitating that criminal endeavor, which criminal activity culminated in the Attack.
- 7. The pattern of racketeering activity conducted by WAMY is separate from the existence of the al Qaida movement, but was a necessary component to the Attack.
- 8. The Enterprise conducts terrorism all over the world; the racketeering activity conducted by WAMY furthers and facilitates that activity, which activity culminated in the Attack. The usual and daily activities of the Enterprise includes recruitment, indoctrination, and the provisioning and operation of training camps, all of which activities are furthered and facilitated by the racketeering activities described herein.
- 9. The Enterprise benefits by spreading its ideology, by suppressing other forms of Islam, and through the gratification of destroying its perceived enemies.
- The Enterprise, and the racketeering activities conducted by WAMY, relies heavily on the American interstate system of commerce for banking, supplies, communications, and virtually all its essential commercial functions, and in that manner affects interstate commerce. Additionally, the Attack itself affected commerce. <u>See Rasul v. Bush</u>, 124 S. Ct. 2686, No. 03-334, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4760, * 8 (stating that the Attack "severely damaged the U.S. economy").
- 11. Not applicable.
- 12. Not applicable.
- 13. The al Qaida movement "employs" certain individuals, only a few of whose identities are known, including defendant Osama bin Laden.
- 14. The history of the conspiracy behind the al Qaida movement could, and has, filled many books, but for purposes of the present RICO Statement, the following is offered. From its inception, al Qaida has relied on ostensible Islamic humanitarian organizations and charities to raise, manage and distribute money and resources for the Enterprise. These so-called charities also actively recruited new members on behalf of the Enterprise,

facilitated shipments of weapons and physical assets to members of the Enterprise, and served as the principal vehicles for spreading the Enterprise's ideology throughout the World.

The funds raised and laundered by these ostensible charities were used to, among other things, operate terrorist training camps in the Sudan, Afghanistan and elsewhere, where some recruits were trained in conventional warfare but where the best and most zealous recruits received terrorist training. The curriculum in the camps placed great emphasis on ideological and religious indoctrination. All trainees and other personnel were encouraged to think creatively about ways to commit mass murder.

The camps were able to operate only because of the worldwide network of charities, fundraisers, recruiters, travel facilitators, and document forgers who vetted recruits and helped them get in and out of Afghanistan and the other countries where al Qaida maintained an operational presence. From the ranks of these recruits the nineteen perpetrators of the Attack were selected. None of this would have been possible without the funds and other support supplied by participants and conspirators like WAMY. Indeed, the Enterprise would not have been successful without the enthusiastic participation of all of the conspirators, including WAMY. In order to identify nineteen individuals willing, able and competent to carry out the Attack, al Qaida needed to select from a vast pool of recruits and trainees, which pool would not have been available to it without the assistance provided by WAMY. These participants, with knowledge and intent, agreed to the overall objectives of the conspiracy, and agreed to commit at least two predicate acts and agreed to participate in the conspiracy, either expressly or impliedly. WAMY also, with knowledge and intent, agreed to and did aid and abet all of the above illegal activities, RICO predicate acts, and RICO violations.

- 15. As the subrogees of both individual and property claimants, plaintiffs have been harmed in their business and property through the claims that they have paid out or for which they have reserved.
- 16. Plaintiffs' damages -- injuries, the loss of life and property damage that resulted from defendants' actions -- are direct in that they are not derivative of damage to a third party. Rather the plaintiffs' insureds' assignees were the "reasonably foreseeable victims of a RICO violation" and the "intended victims of the racketeering enterprise," *i.e.*, terrorism, the culmination of which was the Attack.
- 17. Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the damages suffered by each plaintiff, as set forth in Exhibit "C".

18.

VI	Torture Victim Protection Act,	
	28 U.S.C. § 1350	
VIII	RICO,	
	18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 1962(d)	
Χ	Anti-Terrorism Act,	
	18 U.S.C. § 2333	

19. pendent state claims:

Ι	Trespass
II	Wrongful Death
III	Survival
IV	Assault & Battery
V	Intentional and Negligent
	Infliction of Emotional Distress
VII	Conspiracy
IX	Aiding and Abetting
XI	Negligence
XII	Punitive Damages

20. Not applicable

Dated: August 31, 2005	COZEN O'CONNOR
	By: <u>/S/</u> STEPHEN A. COZEN, ESQUIRE ELLIOTT R. FELDMAN, ESQUIRE SEAN P. CARTER, ESQUIRE 1900 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tele: (215) 665-2000 Fax: (215) 665-2013

EXHIBIT A

I. INTRODUCTION

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is a multi-national organization which has been at the forefront of the global jihadist movement for more than twenty (20) years. Headquartered in Saudi Arabia and with more than sixty (60) offices throughout the world, WAMY publicly claims to be an Islamic "humanitarian and relief" organization, focusing on the needs of Islamic communities, and in particular to the needs of Muslim youth. In reality, WAMY is an extremist organization, dedicated to spreading a radical and virulently anti-Western and anti-democratic ideology throughout the world, and to supporting violent Islamic terrorist organizations and associated separatist movements.

In furtherance of those objectives, WAMY has, for a period of many years: (1) raised and laundered funds on behalf of Islamic terrorist organizations and associated separatist movements, including al Qaida; (2) channeled donated funds to Islamic terrorist organizations, fighters and associated separatist movements, including al Qaida; (3) provided financial and logistical support and physical assets to Islamic fighters and terrorists, including al Qaida; (4) permitted Islamic fighters and terrorists to use ostensible employment with WAMY as a vehicle for gaining access to conflict regions, thereby allowing those individuals to carry out militant and terrorist activities in those areas; (5) performed reconnaissance within conflict regions on behalf of Islamic terrorist organizations and separatist movements, including al Qaida; (6) funded and facilitated shipments of arms and supplies to Islamic terrorist organizations and associated separatist movements, including al Qaida; (7) funded camps used by al Qaida and associated jihadist organizations to train soldiers and terrorists; (8) actively recruited Muslim youths on behalf of Islamic terrorist organizations and associated separatist movements, including al Qaida; (9) served as a distribution channel for transmitting information and documentation within Islamic terrorist

organizations and associated separatist movements, including al Qaida, and from Islamic terrorist organizations and separatist movements to the media; (10) disseminated publications designed to advance al Qaida's radical Islamist ideology throughout the Muslim world and legitimize violent jihad against Christians and Jews on the grounds that they are "infidels" who do not deserve to live; and (11) openly advocated for young Muslims to take up arms against Western and democratic societies.

II. WAMY'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Founded in 1972, WAMY is one of several Islamic institutions operating within the Muslim World League (MWL). Other organizations operating under the auspices of the MWL include the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and Rabita Trust. Headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, WAMY has a physical and operational presence in at least 56 countries worldwide. In addition, WAMY conducts activities in many countries in which it does not maintain a formal physical presence, through its association and membership in other Islamic organizations and committees, including its membership in the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC).

Although WAMY claims non-governmental organization (NGO) status, WAMY is in fact an agency, instrumentality or organ of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. WAMY was established by MWL, itself an agency, instrumentality or organ of the Kingdom, with the formal approval of high ranking officials of the Kingdom. The vast majority of WAMY's funding is provided by the Kingdom. In addition, WAMY's leadership is dominated by high ranking officials of the Kingdom. For example, Dr. Maneh el Johani simultaneously served as both the Secretary General of WAMY and a member of the Kingdom's Shura Council. The Shura Council, known formerly as the Majlis al Shura, is a consultative body which provides advice to the King on issues of importance to the Kingdom. While head of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs,

Saleh bin Abdul Aziz al Sheikh also served as a chairman of WAMY and al Haramain Islamic Foundation.

The Kingdom extensively supervises and controls WAMY's activities. On the macro level, the Kingdom exercises supervisory control over WAMY through the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, established in 1994 to centralize, supervise and review aid requests from Islamic groups, including WAMY. The Supreme Council determines the extent of WAMY's public funding, as well as the causes to which private and public funds are applied by WAMY. WAMY's operations also fall under the supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs is, among other things, responsible for the dissemination and propagation of Wahhabi Islam throughout the world.

Outside of Saudi Arabia, the operations of WAMY's branch offices are directed and closely supervised by local Saudi embassies. According to Dr. Abdullah Wahab Noorwali, Assistant Secretary General of WAMY, the Kingdom "provides us with protection abroad through Saudi embassies and consulates, in addition to financial support." In testimony during Canadian court proceedings, Arafat el Asahi, a representative of MWL and IIRO, made clear that the Saudi embassies closely monitor the activities of the Saudi-based charities and persons associated with those charities, including any press reports relating to those organizations:

If I give any statement in the Canadian papers that goes against the policy of my organization, I would not stay in my office 11 years as I did. That gives me an indication that everybody is within – there is also an embassy in every country. In Pakistan there is a Saudi embassy that knows what happens not only in Saudi organizations but with Saudi individuals. They know who does what.

The operations of WAMY's branch offices are closely supervised and directed by WAMY's central leadership in Saudi Arabia as well, and functionally operate as agents of the central organization. WAMY's central authority in Saudi Arabia uses a variety of mechanisms to rigidly control the branch offices. WAMY's General Assembly and Board of Trustees in Saudi Arabia set policies and procedures for all WAMY branch offices, and hand-pick the officials who run those branch offices. WAMY headquarters also selects the projects and causes for which funds are to be raised by the WAMY offices throughout the world. Funds raised by the branch offices are transferred back to the organization's headquarters, which then redistributes those funds to the regional offices, to be applied to projects and causes selected by WAMY's central leadership. WAMY's branch offices are required to submit detailed reports of their activities and finances to the central leadership in Saudi Arabia, for review and approval. High ranking WAMY officials from Saudi Arabia also conduct periodic inspections of the branch offices. In addition, by virtue of its close relationship with the Kingdom's government, WAMY is able to use the Kingdom's governmental apparatus throughout the world, including the embassies, to monitor the day to day activities of the branches.

III. THE AL QAIDA MOVEMENT'S OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS

Osama bin Laden's al Qaida organization is the self-proclaimed vanguard of the global jihadist movement. While al Qaida's terrorist activities garner the most attention, terrorist attacks represent but one of many vehicles through which al Qaida seeks to undermine U.S. and democratic interests, in pursuit of the establishment of the Pan-Islamic Caliphate. Indeed, al Qaida views the confrontation with the West to have two distinct, but equally important fronts: (1) cultural; and (2) military. In the cultural arena, the global jihadists use Dawa activities (the propagation of the radical Islamic ideology), conducted primarily through ostensible Islamic "charities," as a means to attack Western and democratic ideas and political structures. As the Dutch Intelligence Service explained in a recent report regarding threats to the Western democratic order posed by radical Islamic movements:

The groups focusing on Dawa follow a long-term strategy of continuous influencing based on extreme puritanical, intolerant and

anti-Western ideas. They want Muslims in the West to reject Western values and standards, propagating extreme isolation from western society and often intolerance towards other groups in society. They also encourage these Muslims to (covertly) develop parallel structures in society and to take the law into their own hands. What they mean is that Muslims in the West should turn their backs on the non-Islamic government and instead set up their own autonomous power structures based on specific interpretation of the Sharia.

From Dawa to Jihad – The Various Threats From Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal

Order, General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands, December 2004.

As a compliment to the extensive proselytizing activities carried out with the assistance and support of ostensible charities, al Qaida engages in militant and violent operations throughout the World. Al Qaida's military activities are by no means limited to terrorist attacks. In fact, in establishing al Qaida, Osama bin Laden sought to create a multi-national Islamic army to challenge the perceived domination of the democratic West, and engage in armed combat wherever Muslim communities were perceived to be under duress. Although high profile terrorist attacks are an important aspect of that campaign, al Qaida's military efforts have focused largely on supporting armed jihad in conflict regions and fostering Islamic separatist movements throughout the World. In this context, al Qaida has been deeply involved in military campaigns, involving both traditional forms of combat and terrorist activities, in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Sudan, Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, the Phillipines, Somalia, Palestine, Yemen, Kenya, Tanzania and Egypt. Al Qaida's participation in these regional conflicts takes many forms. Al Qaida provides funding and logistical assistance to local extremist organizations, in support of their military and terrorist activities. In addition, al Qaida deploys members to train and fight alongside local Muslims, and to assist in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks.

Through its military activities in these "regional" conflicts, al Qaida aims to establish and support radical Islamic regimes, a critical component of al Qaida's long-term strategy. In

describing the importance of those regional military campaigns within the overall context of al

Qaida's campaign against the West, a recently de-classified 1998 Department of Defense

Intelligence Report states:

[al Qaida] seeks to establish a worldwide Islamic state capable of directly challenging the US, China, Russia, and what it views as judeo-Christian and Confucian domination.

The means by which the above goals are to be met are via terror, ethnic cleansing, "latent penetration" (NEI), and control over nuclear and biological weapons (Jikhad). Further, radical Islamic (predominantly Sunni) regimes are to be established and supported everywhere possible, including Bosnia, Albania, Chechnya, Dagestan, the entire northern Caucasus "from Sea to Sea," central Asian Republics, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, all of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and the states of the Persian Gulf.

Swift Night Report Concerning Terrorist Activities of Sheikh Usam Ben Muhammad Ben Avad

Ben Laden, United States Department of Defense, October 1998 ("1998 Defense Department Report").

Al Qaida also derives significant short-term benefits from its active participation in these regional conflicts. Among other things, these operations bolster the organization's image among local Muslim communities, and represent an integral component of al Qaida's ongoing recruiting and fundraising efforts. Al Qaida's involvement in these militant campaigns also affords the organization a vehicle to provide new members with battle experience, in preparation for terrorist operations and the anticipated military conflict with the West. In fact, several of the September 11 hijackers were chosen for that attack, at least in part, because they had previous combat experience in Bosnia. The importance of these "regional" conflicts to al Qaida's growth and development cannot be overstated. Perhaps more than any other factor, al Qaida's participation in these "regional" conflicts has enabled al Qaida to extend its sphere of influence throughout the globe.

IV. WAMY'S ROLE IN ADVANCING THE AL QAIDA MOVEMENT

For more than a decade, WAMY has knowingly and intentionally used its international infrastructure as a tool for supporting the al Qaida movement, on both the ideological and military fronts. As a result of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's extensive patronage, WAMY possesses a multi-million dollar annual budget. WAMY dedicates a significant portion of that budget to the publication and worldwide dissemination of literature calculated to promote the global jihadist agenda, convince young Muslims to reject the United States and democratic ideas as evil and non-Muslim, demonize Christians, Jews and non-Wahhabi Muslims, and convince young Muslims to engage in violent jihad against the West and Israel.

Virulently anti-American, anti-Semitic and pro-jihadist propaganda pervade WAMY's "educational" publications. For example, under the heading "The Prophet asks for Jihad," the WAMY book *Islamic Views* says, "The Prophet Mohammad fought against the infidels and the Jews till he triumphed over them and conducted himself about twenty invasions and he sent tens of regiments led by his companions for Jihad...Damn from Allah to the Jews who made graves of their prophets as Masjid." Later, *Islamic Views* says Islam "is a religion of Jihad" and that jihad "was an answer for the Jews, the liars." "[T]each our children to love taking revenge on the Jews and the oppressors, and teach them that our youngsters will liberate Palestine and al-Quds when they go back to Islam and make Jihad for the sake of Allah." *Islamic Views* further exhorts Muslims to wage "Jihad against the Satan," and that "You should not back the Jews and the Christians and the Communists against the Muslims; the Communists, the Infidels, the Jews, and the Christians, those who do not believe in Mohammed. You should say they are infidels."

The jihad WAMY advocates in its publications is intensely violent. According to a WAMY policy statement, "[a] Christian should be asked to repent. If he does not he must be killed." *See Written Statement of James B. Jacobsen, President of Christian Solidarity*

International, submitted to the Sub-Committee of International Relations and Human Rights, Hearing on Persecution of Christians Worldwide, February 15, 1996. The book *Islamic Camps: Objectives, Program Outlines and Preparatory Steps*, prepared by WAMY's Camps and Conferences Unit and intended to serve as a manual for Islamic youth camps, suggests that youths attending WAMY camps be led in the following refrain:

Hail! Hail! O Sacrificing Soldiers! To Us! To Us!

So we may defend the flag on this Day of Jihad, are you miserly with your blood?!

And has life become dearer to you? And staying behind sweeter?

Is staying in this world of torment more pleasing to us?

You are amongst those called upon by Destiny.

Come! So we may revive the times the times of our predecessors!

Through these and other WAMY publications, as well as the madrassas, camps, Islamic Centers, mosques, conferences and other events it sponsors, WAMY has provided the ideological foundation for the al Qaida movement, and actively advocated young Muslims to take up arms and engage in violent jihad against the United States. In this regard, WAMY has played a critical role in al Qaida's cultural assault on the United States and democratic institutions throughout the world.

Consistent with the extremist agenda it advocates, WAMY has immersed itself deeply in the militant endeavors of the global jihadist movement as well, actively supporting the militant and terrorist activities of al Qaida and associated organizations in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Kashmir, Pakistan, South East Asia, the United States and elsewhere. WAMY's support for al Qaida's militant and terrorist activities has taken many forms, and continuously adapted to the serve the needs of the expanding jihadist movement. Under the guise of charity and humanitarian relief, WAMY has, among other things: raised and laundered funds for militant and terrorist activities; funded and facilitated al Qaida training camps as well as the movement of fighters, arms and other supplies to conflict regions; performed reconnaissance on behalf of al Qaida and associated groups; and operated as a recruiting vehicle for al Qaida and associated groups. Through these criminal activities, WAMY has further helped al Qaida to expand its sphere of influence throughout the globe.

WAMY's pervasive involvement in supporting al Qaida fighters and associated local

jihadist groups in regional conflicts was well documented prior to September 11, 2001. On

December 5, 1992, the New York Times identified WAMY as a front for armed Islamic jihad in

Bosnia. According to the article:

The conflict between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina... has been adopted by Islamic fundamentalists as the newest holy war against Christian infidels bent on the destruction of Islam.

In the last few weeks, the conflict has lured several hundred militants, many of them veterans of the war in Afghanistan, to volunteer for the Bosnian forces....

The volunteers are sponsored by a variety of militant religious organizations and often have their expenses and plane fare covered.... Despite formal denials from the relief organizations, Saudi officials say an increasing amount of the charity on behalf of the Bosnians is now used to provide arms and logistical support for Arab volunteers.

"Since August, most of the money raised for relief has been turned over to the Bosnians for weapons," a Saudi official.... The World Assembly of Muslim Youth, which organized relief operations in Afghanistan and is now deeply involved in the conflict in the Balkans, flies back wounded Saudi fighters and provides free medical care in the Saudi German hospital.

Muslims From Afar Joining "Holy War" in Bosnia, New York Times, December 5, 1992.

Within the same article, Adel Batterjee, the then chairman of WAMY, acknowledged the

organization's role in supporting armed Islamic jihad in Bosnia: "if a relief worker decides that

he wants to join the fighting forces, we would not stop him...." Following the September 11,

2001 attack, Adel Batterjee was formally designated as a terrorist sponsor and supporter pursuant

to Executive Order 13224.

In May of 2000, Russian officials similarly accused the SJRC, the committee through

which WAMY conducted activities in Chechnya, of financing and otherwise supporting Islamic

terrorists and separatists in that region. According to a May 19, 2000 article in the Russian

newspaper *ITAR-TASS*:

The aid to Chechens fighting against Russia, is delivered from the organization of humanitarian assistance to Muslims of Kosovo and Chechnya (the SJRC)....

Officially, the money is sent to Chechnya to be used for religious events and Islamic feasts, but is actually used to finance rebel troops [a representative of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)].

According to available information, part of the money is transferred to banking accounts of some warlords, including Shamil Basayev and Khattab...

Russia's security services are aware that these people are financing rebel forces, overseeing arms, food and medicine deliveries, as well as arranging treatment for the wounded and paying allowances to guerillas.

Chechen Separatists Said Funded by Several Foreign Sources, ITAR-TASS, May 19, 2000.

Significantly, Amir Khattab, one of the individuals who received financing directly from

WAMY and the SJRC, is a senior al Qaida member who was deployed to Chechnya by Osama

bin Laden to organize al Qaida's operations in that area. According to the 1998 Department of

Defense Intelligence Report:

In 1995, Khattab appeared in Chechnya to carry out a special mission assigned to him by Usama ben Laden to organize training camps for international terrorists.... He was a colonel, fought as a field commander, and was wounded in the hand. Khattab organized three training camps in the Vedeno and Nojai-Urt areas of the forested mountain zone. Graduation is held at the three

camps every two months. They are very equipped, with firing range facilities and capabilities to create models of "sites of diversion," as well as classes for sappers and snipers.

1998 Defense Department Report.

By no later than 1999, the details of bin Laden's direct links to Khattab and the Chechen mujihadeen were the subject of widespread reporting in the mainstream media. For instance, in August of 1999, NBC News published a report stating that "Osama bin Laden is financing the Chechen operation in Dagestan..." *U.S. Links bin Laden to Chechnya, MSNBC.com*, August 15, 1999. The article, which was based on information provided by senior U.S. intelligence officials, explained that the "key bin Laden connection" to the Chechen jihadists was Amir Khattab, and that their relationship was so close that bin Laden was considering relocating from Afghanistan to areas of Chechnya under Khattab's control. *Id.*

Prior to the September 11th Attack, WAMY officials made little effort to conceal their involvement in sponsoring armed jihad in Chechnya. To the contrary, at least within the Arabic press, WAMY officials openly acknowledged that the organization was deeply involved in sponsoring militant activities in Chechnya. For example, in a January 15, 2000 article published in *Al Jazeera* newspaper, Dr. Maneh al Jahari, the Secretary General of WAMY, wrote as follows:

[I] want to stress that these heroic Moslems, the Mujihadeen who are standing strong, deserve to receive our support and we must invest all of our energy in aiding them when they are being fed the taste of defeat once again. ... It should be pointed out that WAMY has doubled its efforts and has placed all of its branches inside and outside of the Kingdom on alert to serve the Chechen issue and to implement the aid program for the Chechen refugees.

1. The question that must be asked is: What do the Chechen Muslims need from us today?

2. The need money to buy arms and ammunition. (emphasis supplied)

The Islamic awakening, which is growing, praise be to Allah, is that which worries the Communist East and Heretic West, and they are afraid they will awaken one day and the Muslims will demand payment of a poll tax.

Triumph is coming and Islam will remain and Allah will rise and be victorious. I request Allah for our brothers Mujihadeen in Chechnya and Dagestan, stability, reinforcements and victory.

The Chechen Tragedy – The Reality and the Required Role, Dr. Maneh al Jahari, *al Jazeera*, January 15, 2000.

Significantly, al Jahari published his call for Muslims to donate funds to WAMY to buy "arms and ammunition" for the "mujihadeen" in Chechnya and Dagestan well after the direct and close relationship between those militants and al Qaida had been widely detailed in the media and elsewhere. The timing and character of al Jahari's statements thus confirm that WAMY is a front for militant activity, and fundamentally undermine the organization's efforts to cast itself as a peaceful humanitarian and relief organization.

Philippine officials also publicly implicated WAMY in the financing of terrorist activities in Southeast Asia in the years prior to the September 11th Attack. According to a January 19, 1999 article in the *Australian General News*, the government of the Philippines accused WAMY's Australian branch of financing the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a terrorist organization seeking to establish a separate Islamic state on the Philippine island of Mindanao. *Phillipines Suspect Australian Group of Helping Rebels, Australian General News*, January 15, 1999. MILF was responsible for several bombings and attacks on remote villages in the Philippines that forced 400 civilians to flee in January of 1999. In February of 1999, MILF Chief Hashim Salamat publicly confirmed that MILF had received funds from Osama bin Laden. *Patterns of Global Terrorism – 1999*, United States Department of State, April 2000.

Statements by government officials and press reports in the years preceding the September 11th attack also reveal WAMY's extensive role in supporting al Qaida activities in

Kashmir. According to a December 8, 1995 article in the periodical *Money Clips*, a Kashmiri leader publicly thanked WAMY during a press conference for "helping the Mujihadeen in their struggle for independence from India." *Kashmiri Leader Thanks WAMY for Help, Money Clips*, December 8, 1995. Separate articles published prior to September 11, 2001 reveal that WAMY funneled support to the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Lashkar-e-Taibah and Hizb ul Mujahideen, three violent jihadist groups operating under the broader al Qaida umbrella. *See SIMI: Nursery of Hate, India Today*, April 2, 2001; *ISI Twin Plan – Attack Christians, Defame Hindu Outfits, The Economic Times of India*, July 15, 2000; *Kashmir: Hizb-Ul-Mojahedin Chief Explains Reasons Behind Cease Fire, BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, August 23, 2000; *Pakistani Behind Chruch Blast Say Police, The Statesmen (India)*, July 14, 2000. In an interview contained in one of the articles, SIMI head Safdar Nagori publicly confirmed his organization's allegiance to al Qaida:

Q: In your conferences, you have openly eulogized Osama bin Laden.

A: Not once, but dozens of times. We believe he has shown great character in standing up the Americans, the biggest terrorists in the World.

SIMI: Nursery of Hate, India Today, April 2, 2001.

In March of 2003, al Qaida military chief Abu Zubaydah was arrested at a Lahkar-e-Taibah safehouse in Islamabad, confirming the depth of collaboration and reciprocal support between those two terrorist organizations.

WAMY's sponsorship of jihadist activity in Kashmir was channeled through its offices in Pakistan, which sponsored al Qaida activity in that country as well. In connection with a crackdown on terrorist activity prompted by the September 11th Attack, Pakistani authorities deported 89 employees of ostensible NGOs in October of 2001, based on their suspected ties to terrorism. WAMY was among the organizations whose "employees" were specifically targeted

by the measure. Pakistani intelligence officials, operating in conjunction with agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations of the United States, raided WAMY's Pakistani offices approximately one year later, as part of ongoing counter-terrorism efforts. WAMY's close ties to senior al Qaida cells in Afghanistan and Pakistan were revealed just one week after the raid, when an employee of WAMY hand delivered a recorded message from Osama bin Laden to an Arab television network in Islamabad. *Pakistan Questions Sudan Man About Tape, Associated Press Online*, December 9, 2002.

That incident did not represent the first occasion on which WAMY was involved in transferring information on behalf of al Qaida. During the investigation into the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, U.S. officials discovered an al Qaida training manual in the possession of Ahmed Ajaj, who was later convicted for his role in that attack. The manual, entitled *"Military Lessons In The Jihad Against The Tyrants,"* was distributed to Ajaj by WAMY and detailed how to establish and maintain clandestine operational sales. The same manual was subsequently recovered from the London apartment of African embassy bomber Khalid al-Fawwaz in 1998.

Until shortly after the September 11th Attack, WAMY also maintained a physical presence in the United States, from which the organization channeled material support and resources to al Qaida. WAMY's U.S. offices were established in Falls Church, VA in 1992 by Abdullah bin Laden and Omar bin Laden, blood nephews of al Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Under Abdullah bin Laden's leadership, WAMY's U.S. branch was deeply involved in the terrorist activities of the SAAR Network of businesses and charities. Federal authorities raided WAMY's U.S. offices in 2002, in connection with an ongoing investigation of the SAAR Network's role in sponsoring al Qaida.

Despite the increased scrutiny of WAMY's operations following the September 11th Attack, the organization continues to sponsor al Qaida and associated terrorist organizations and separatist movements to this day, demonstrating the organization's deep and longstanding commitment to al Qaida's global jihad.

In June of 2002, Indian authorities arrested two men under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, after determining that they had transferred funds to Sayed Ali Shah Geelani, the leader of the Fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami party. According to sources within India's government, the two men, Farooq Ahmed and Mohammed Maqbool, were given funds by Nazir Qureshi, a senior WAMY official, to be covertly delivered to Geelani. Geelani previously had been arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act based on his involvement in transferring money to militant organizations in Kashmir. *Geelani Case: Two Detained in Srinagar*, June 11, 2002.

In September of 2003, Romanian intelligence officials implicated WAMY in an al Qaida plot to hijack a plane departing from Romania and crash it into Heathrow Airport in London. According to an article published by the *Global New Wire* on September 5, 2003, the plot was being coordinated by al Qaida affiliated members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Romania. Quoting information obtained from Romanian intelligence officials, the article asserts that the Romanian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood acts under the cover of various humanitarian organizations, and receives most of its funds from WAMY. *Intelligence Service "Alert" Watches Egypt's "Muslim Brothers" in Romania, Global News Wire*, September 5, 2003.

Recent statements by Treasury Department officials, testifying before Congress, further confirm that WAMY continues to serve as a front for al Qaida and other terrorist organizations. During a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey asserted that "wealthy Saudi financiers and charities have funded terrorist organizations and causes that support terrorism and the ideology

that fuels the terrorists' agenda... Even today, we believe that Saudi donors may still be a significant source of terrorist financing, including for the insurgency in Iraq." Levey expressed particular concern about the continued involvement of WAMY, the IIRO and MWL in the financing of terrorist activities throughout the globe.¹ *Prepared Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury*, Submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing on Money Laundering and Terror Financing Issues in the Middle East, July 13, 2005.

V. WAMY'S KNOWLEDGE

For many years prior to the September 11th Attack, senior WAMY officials were expressly aware of WAMY's pervasive sponsorship of terrorist organizations and associated separatist movements throughout the world. To begin with, as detailed above, the misconduct of WAMY's offices throughout the world was widely reported in the media prior to September 11, 2001. Given the senior leadership's close supervision of the activities of the regional offices, there can be no question that high ranking WAMY officials were aware of the media reports implicating those regional offices in the sponsorship of terrorist organizations and associated separatist movements.

In fact, the available evidence reveals that the senior leadership of WAMY directly orchestrated and participated in the support provided to al Qaida and affiliated militants through the regional offices. Adel Batterjee's statements in 1992, in which he acknowledged WAMY's role in channeling recruits to the Bosnian mujihadeen, confirm the direct involvement of senior WAMY leadership in supporting Islamic militants in the Balkans. Maneh al Jahari's 2000 *al Jazeera* article, in which he openly solicited funds and reinforcements for the Chechen

¹ Under Congressional procedures, the full transcript of this hearing will not be available for approximately five months. Plaintiffs believe that the full transcript may contain further details regarding WAMY's involvement in the sponsorship of al Qaida and other fundamentalist organizations, and reserve their right to supplement the record with a copy of that transcript as soon as it is available.

mujihadeen, similarly reveal that WAMY leadership in Saudi Arabia directly orchestrated the organization's support for Islamic radicals in Chechnya. WAMY leadership also directly participated in the sponsorship of Kashmiri military groups, as evidenced by the Indian Intelligence Service's finding that Nazir Qureshi, a senior WAMY official, personally sought to channel funds to Sayed Ali Shah Geelani.

Given the close ties between WAMY's senior leadership and high level officials of the Kingdom, it is also reasonable to infer that WAMY's leaders received warnings regarding their organization's illegal activities through official governmental channels. In this regard, it is important to note that officials of the Kingdom received numerous warnings regarding the Saudi charities' involvement in sponsoring Islamic terrorists and militants in the years leading up to September 11th. During a 1994 meeting with senior officials of the Kingdom, French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua expressed the French government's deep concerns regarding the pervasive involvement of the Saudi charities in the sponsorship and funding of terrorist organizations. Pasqua specifically mentioned the MWL, WAMY's parent organization, during that meeting. At a conference of Arab interior ministers in 1998, the Egyptian Minister of Interior similarly expressed specific concerns about the involvement of Saudi charities in the sponsorship of terrorist activities to Saudi Prince Naif. In 1999 and 2000, delegations from the U.S. government met with senior officials of the Kingdom, to address the U.S. government's concerns regarding the extensive involvement of Saudi charities in the sponsorship of terrorism. As WAMY had been implicated in the sponsorship of terrorist activities by numerous governments prior to those meetings, it is only reasonable to assume that U.S. authorities would have specifically discussed WAMY at those meetings. In all likelihood, Saudi officials would have received multiple warnings regarding WAMY's involvement in the sponsorship of Islamic terrorist and militants from the U.S. government well before those meetings, as a joint

intelligence sharing program relating to terrorist activities existed between the two nations from 1997 forward.

The evidence strongly suggests that Saudi officials received similar warnings from officials of other governments as well. In the years leading up to the September 11th Attack, officials from the Russian, Philippine, Indian, and Pakistani governments all publicly implicated WAMY in the financing of terrorists and extremist activities throughout the World. Thus, there can be little doubt that officials of these nations voiced their concerns regarding WAMY's misconduct during official discussions with Saudi authorities as well.

A review of United Nations' Resolutions relating to the financing of terrorism supports this conclusion. U.N. Resolution 51-210, adopted by the General Assembly in 1996, contains a specific provision calling upon all states "to take steps to prevent and counter-act, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorist and terrorist organizations, *whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals*...." (emphasis supplied). The *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*, adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 54-109 on December 9, 1999, contains the same language. The inclusion of specific language addressing the role of charitable organizations in the financing of terrorism in these U.N. Resolutions makes clear that that the involvement of Islamic charities in the sponsorship of terrorist organizations was a subject of particular interest and discourse within the international community in the years prior to the September 11th Attack.

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that WAMY knowingly and intentionally used its international infrastructure as a tool for channeling financial, logistical and ideological support to al Qaida and affiliated groups, for a period of many years leading up to the September 11th Attack.